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Usury in Pennsylvania: Revision of
Maximum Interest Rate and Finance
Charge Laws
I. Introduction
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your single bond. And, in a merry sport,
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me.'
Unlike Shylock in The Merchant of Venice, legitimate money-
lenders refrain from taking their "pound of flesh." The fear of un-
scrupulous and dishonest lenders, however, has fostered state regula-
tion of interest rates on loans.2 Since usury3 laws apply only to the
use or loan of money, installment sales of goods and services are not
covered by the provisions of those statutes.4 Nevertheless, statutory
limits on finance charges for installment sales and accounts5 serve
the same function as usury laws.6
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, Act I, scene iii.
2. The power to establish maximum interest rates for the loan of money is a recognized
police power of the states. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910); Equitable Credit &
Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941); Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129,
104 A. 505 (1918).
3. The current definition of usury is the taking or receving of a rate of interest greater
than that allowed by law for the use or loan of money or its equivalent. Melnicoff v. Huber
Inv. Co., 12 Pa. D. & C. 405, 407 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1929). One court has set out the elements of
a usurious contract as follows: (1) an unlawful intent; (2) money or its equivalent as subject
matter of the contract; (3) a loan or forbearance; (4) an unconditional obligation to repay the
loan; and (5) a taking for the loan of something in excess of the legal rate. In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d
944, 945 (D. Minn. 1925).
4. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra.
5. An installment sale is "the sale of goods or the furnishing of services by a retail seller
to a retail buyer for a time sale price payable in installments." Goods and Services Installment
Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1201(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979). An installment account is
"an account established by an agreement pursuant to which the buyer promises to pay, in
installments, to a retail seller or to a financing agency, his outstanding balance incurred in
retail installment sales. ... Id. § 1201(7).
6. This combination of usury statutes and finance charge laws regulates the cost of bor-
rowing and buying. These laws determine not only the price of borrowing, but, more impor-
tantly, whether funds are available to borrow at all. If rate ceilings do not allow lenders a
reasonable profit, lenders will put their money in other transactions rather than loans. This
practice, called disintermediation, is just as effective in preventing consumers from obtaining
The basic purpose of usury7 legislation is to protect necessitous
and inexperienced borrowers and consumers8 from overextensions of
credit that result in extreme hardship to themselves and their fami-
lies.9 If overextension of credit results in default, borrowers may
face such problems as marital difficulties, personal guilt, a reduced
standard of living, and substantial worry over loss of employment.' 0
Therefore, usury laws attempt to protect consumers who are unable
to determine the hardship that a credit transaction may place upon
them. '
Pennsylvania has enacted numerous provisions establishing
ceilings on loan interest rates and finance charges.' 2 These laws exist
as piecemeal legislation rather than a unified code, and their current
structure does not adequately fulfill the purpose of a usury system.
Consequently, new legislation is needed to effectively protect con-
sumers and borrowers.
This comment reviews the usury statutes of Pennsylvania and
examines the problems associated with them. The possibility of en-
acting a comprehensive interest rate and finance charge law is ex-
plored and comparisons made with unified laws that have recently
been proposed.
credit as extremely high interest rates. See Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Con-
sumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REV. 81, 109-10 (1967). Statutory ceilings may also
affect the cost of an item purchased with cash because sellers will inflate the cash price to hide
additional finance charges. Therefore, cash buyers pay part of the cost of credit. B. CLARK &
J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 126 (1972); Malcolm, The New Maximum
Charge in THE REALITIES OF MAXIMUM CEILINGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CHARGES 23,
34-35 (1969).
7. For purposes of this comment, usury refers to both interest rate and finance charge
legislation.
8. Johnson, Interest and Usury in THE REALITIES OF MAXIMUM CEILINGS ON INTEREST
AND FINANCE CHARGES 5, 16-17 (1969). Courts recognize that interest ceilings serve "to thor-
oughly and effectively protect the borrower against the rapacity of an avaricious lender" and
"an impecunious and necessitous borrower against himself." Thompson v. Prettyman, 231 Pa.
1, 5, 79 A. 874, 876 (1911).
9. Oeltjen, Usury. Utilitarian or UselessZ 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 169, 212-13 (1975).
10. Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461, 471-72 (1973).
Excessive use of credit results in other costs to society. The costs of the legal system to settle
credit disputes is subsidized by society. Loss of work time by debtors involved in credit
problems results in lost productivity. Consumers who experience coercive collection tactics
may lose respect for the courts and the entire legal system. Id at 470-71.
11. Another reason for passage of usury legislation is to exclude welfare recipients from
the credit market. If legislators believe that welfare payments are used to purchase color tele-
visions, new cars, and other nonessential items, "then it is a simple step to rationalize the
actions of legislators as an attempt to curtail the amount of credit obtained by these consum-
ers." Avio, An Economic Rationalefor Statutory Interest Rate Ceilings, 13 Q. REV. ECON. &
Bus. 61, 67 (1973).
Usury laws are also supported on the ground that they deter moneylenders from making
loans to high-risk borrowers. Loans for risky business investments obstruct the flow of money
into necessary business ventures. Jadlow, Adam Smith on Usury Laws, 32 J. FINANCE 1195,
1196-97 (1977).
12. See notes 13-35 and accompanying text infra.
II. Pennsylvania Usury Laws
Enacted in 1688, the first usury law in the Commonwealth es-
tablished the lawful rate of interest at eight percent per annum,
13
which subsequent statutes reduced to six percent per annum. " Since
this general usury rate applies to all lenders and borrowers and to all
kinds of loans, 5 many exceptions have developed. An effort to un-
derstand the problems connected with the usury system in Penn-
sylvania must begin by examining and categorizing the various
exceptions to the basic legal interest rate.
A. Consumer Legislation
Since the general usury law made no distinctions between types
of loans, by the end of the nineteenth century small loans that were
unprofitable to make at the legal interest rate began to disappear or
were made by loan sharks' 6 at usurious rates.' 7 A nationwide effort
to counteract the growth of loan sharking culminated in the drafting
of the Uniform Small Loan Law. 8 Pennsylvania, however, had al-
ready adopted a small loan law' 9 that allowed licensed lenders to
13. Act of March 10, 1688, ch. 187. This act provided:
That none shall take directly or indirectly for the Loan or Use of Money or anie
Commodities above the Value of Eight pounds for the forbearance of one hundred
Pounds for a year and So proportionable after that rate, and they that receive or take
more shall forfeit the monie or other things Lent ....
Id.
14. See Residential Mortgage Act (Act No. 6), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 201 (Purdon
Supp. 1979); Act of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622, No. 557 (repealed 1974); Act of March 2, 1722-23,
ch. 262 (repealed 1858).
15. Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L.
REV. 327, 328 (1967).
These statutes made no distinction between a rich borrower and a poor one.
They made no distinction between a sophisticated, informed borrower and a naive,
ignorant one. They made no distinction between a risky loan and a secure one. They
made no distinction between a production loan and a loan for consumer goods. They
made no distinction between established lending institutions and fly-by-night opera-
tors. They made no distinction between a small loan with high administrative costs
and a large loan with low administrative costs.
Id
16. For a discussion of the loan shark business, see Seidl, Criminal Loan Sharking in THE
REALITIES OF MAXIMUM CEILINGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CHARGES 41 (1969).
17. See Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 819, 838-40 (1968).
18. Johnson, supra note 6, at 82. Section 13(a) of the Seventh Draft of the Uniform
Small Loan Law (1942) provides:
Every licensee hereunder may contract for and receive, on any loan of money
not exceeding $300 in amount, charges at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent a month on
that part of the unpaid principal balance of any loan not in excess of $100, and 2 per
cent a month on any remainder of such unpaid principal balance.
R. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS 681 (1952).
19. Small Loans Act, Act of June 17, 1915, P.L. 1012, No. 432 (repealed 1976). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had declared an earlier attempt to pass a small loan law uncon-
stitutional. The court had interpreted the statute, the Act of June 5, 1913, P.L. 429, No. 285, as
an attempt to enact special legislation in violation of art. 3, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion (1874) and observed that:
The general scheme of the act is, to create into a class persons absolutely undist-
inguishable from the entire body of citizenship by anything suggesting differentiation
charge higher interest rates for loans not exceeding $300, which
made it profitable for lenders to loan small amounts of money to
borrowers.2 °
Another problem facing consumers resulted from the adoption
of the "time-price" doctrine, which views a contract as not usurious
if the contracting parties agree on one price for a cash sale and a
greater price for a sale permitting installment payments.2' Since
Pennsylvania courts have determined that the difference between the
cash price and the credit price is not a loan, the general usury law
does not apply to installment sales of land, goods, and services.22
Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has asserted that "the
financing of sales of merchandise by the extension of credit has
never been considered subject to the prohibition of usury or to regu-
lations applicable to banking and loan transactions.
23
The adoption of the "time-price" doctrine permitted merchants
to impose extremely high finance charges. Disclosures of dishonest
practices, however, illustrated the need for consumer protection.24
with respect to rights, privileges, immunities, or peculiarities, whether arising out of
personal or business relations, and then to invest such class with a privilege denied to
all not within the class, namely, the right to collect on money loaned a rate of interest
in excess of that to which all others are confined.
Commonwealth v. Young, 248 Pa. 458, 461, 94 A. 141, 142 (1915). The 1915 Act was valid
because it applied only to loans of $300 or less and, thus, was directed at a specific class of
borrowers who were distinguishable from the public. Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129,
104 A. 505 (1918).
20. The interest rate established by the statute was 3% per month on loans not exceeding
$100 and 2% per month on loans between $100 and $300. Small Loans Act, Act of June 17,
1915, P.L. 1012, No. 432, § 2 (repealed 1976).
21. The United States Supreme Court first announced the "time-price" doctrine in Hogg
v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). In Hogg the Court hypothesized that "ifA propose to
sell to B a tract of land for $10,000 in cash, or for $20,000 payable in ten annual instalments,
and if B prefers to pay the larger sum to gain time, the contract cannot be called usurious." Id
at 118-19. A majority ofjurisdictions have adopted the "time-price" doctrine. For a compila-
tion of these jurisdictions, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).
The leading Pennsylvania case on point is Melnicoffv. Huber Inv. Co., 12 Pa. D. & C. 405
(Phila. Mun. Ct. 1929). In that case, the plaintiff leased a car under an installment plan. The
amount of service charges assessed by the lessor exceeded the legal rate of interest of 6%. The
plaintiff claimed that the transaction was usurious and sought to recover the amount paid over
the legal rate. The court, however, determined that the usury laws applied only to a loan and
asserted that "if there be a real and bonafide purchase or a lease not made as an occasion or
pretext for a loan, the transaction will not be regarded usurious, even though the sale or lease
be for an exorbitant price." Id at 407 (emphasis in original).
The "time-price" doctrine has been firmly established by subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941); Equipment Fin.,
Inc. v. Grannas, 207 Pa. Super. Ct. 363, 218 A.2d 81 (1966).
22. Comment, Bank Credit Cards.- The Service Charge Problem, 77 DICK. L. REv. 139,
146 (1972); See generaly Comment, The Pennsylvania Goods and Services Installment Sales
Act. One Man's Interest, Another Man's Service Charge, 77 DICK. L. REV. 493, 498-504 (1973).
23. Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 455, 21 A.2d 53, 58 (1941).
24. A study by a state commission disclosed "nefarious, unscrupulous and improper
practices in the financing of the sale of motor vehicles in this Commonwealth which are unjus-
tifiably detrimental to the consumer and inimical to the public welfare." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, § 602(a) (Purdon 1965). Newspaper coverage and consumer complaints of fly-by-night
operators in the contracting business brought attention to home improvement financing. Com-
ment, Legislative Solution to a Judicial Dilemma. The Pennsylvania Home Improvement Finance
Act, 10 VILL. L. REV. 309, 309 (1965).
The legislature sought to thwart these practices by passing the Motor
Vehicle Sales Finance Act,25 the Home Improvement Finance Act,
26
and the Goods and Services Installment Sales Act.27  The finance
charge ceilings established by these laws regulate most consumer in-
stallment sales and accounts.
B. Lending Institution Regulation
In addition to the enactment of consumer credit legislation, the
legislature enacted several statutes setting maximum interest rates
for specific lending institutions. The rate ceiling established by these
laws supersedes the general usury rate of six percent per annum.28
These rates vary depending upon the type of lender and sometimes
upon the purpose of the loan. 29  Loans from these lending institu-
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (Purdon 1965).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101 to 602 (Purdon 1971).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Purdon Supp. 1979). This statute applies to all
installment sales and installment accounts for goods and services primarily for personal, fam-
ily, or household purposes except transactions within the provisions of the Home Improvement
Finance Act and vehicles covered by the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. Id § 1201(1), (2).
For a discussion of the Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, see 12 VILL. L. REV. 643
(1967).
28. Residential Mortgage Act (Act No. 6), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 604 (Purdon Supp.
1979). The relevant portion of § 604 provides:
If any maximum lawful rate of interest provided for in this act is inconsistent
with the provision of any other act establishing, permitting or removing a maximum
interest rate, or prohibiting the use of usury as a defense, then the provision of such
other act shall prevail.
Id
29. Section 309(a) of the Banking Code of 1965, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 101-2204 (Pur-
don 1967), provides:
An institution may make a charge for an installment loan which complies with the
requirements of this section, at a rate not in excess of six dollars ($6) per one hundred
dollars ($100) per annum computed on the original principal amount for the period
of the loan. If such loan is one of a series of loans under an agreement ("revolving
credit plan") providing a maximum outstanding balance of all such loans at any
time, the institution may make a charge at a rate not in excess of one per cent per
month on the actual outstanding balance of the loan.
Id. Banks are permitted to make installment loans for commercial, business, professional,
agricultural, or nonprofit purposes at rates not in excess of $5 per $100 per annum, or if on a
revolving credit plan, at a rate not in excess of 3/ of 1% per month on the outstanding balance.
Id § 316 (Purdon Supp. 1979). In addition, the Code allows monthly interest on loans for
individuals, partnerships, and other unincorporated entities at a rate not in excess of 1% per
month on the outstanding balance. Id § 317.
The Savings Association Code of 1967, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6020-1 to 254 (Purdon
Supp. 1979), authorizes loans by savings associations for several purposes: mortgages; loans
for property repair, alteration and improvement; loans on chattel paper; loans on the security
of savings accounts and certificates; and educational loans.
The Credit Union Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 12301-12333 (Purdon 1967), authorizes
the establishment of a credit union "for the purpose of promoting thrift among its members
and creating a source of credit for such members, at reasonable rates of interest, for provident
purposes." Id § 12302. To carry out this purpose, the Act provides that "[ijnterest rates on
loans made by a credit union to its members shall not exceed the rate of six per centum per
annum, when discounted on loans which are repayable in equal installments, or the rate of
twelve per centum per annum, when calculated on the unpaid principal balances." Id
§ 12319.
The Consumer Discount Company Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-6219 (Purdon
1967), provides that a corporation licensed under the Act has authority "[t]o charge, contract
tions present consumers with an alternative to buying on installment
plans.
C Recent Legislation
A recent statute affecting an interest rate ceiling is the Residen-
tial Mortgage Act,3" which the legislature adopted to relieve tight
money conditions in the residential mortgage sector of the credit
market.3 ' The Act retains the general usury rate of six percent per
annum, but adopts a flexible interest rate for residential mortgages.
32
The flexible interest rate is determined by adding two and one-half
percent per annum to the Monthly Index of Long Term United
States Government Bond Yields for the second preceding month.
33
This flexible interest rate provides a realistic level at which lenders
can make residential mortgages 34 and ensures the availability of loan
funds in the residential mortgage market.35
for, receive or collect interest or discount at a rate not to exceed nine dollars and fifty cents
($9.50) per one hundred dollars ($100) per year when the contract is repayable within thirty-six
(36) months from the date of making." Any loan in excess of 36 months is subject to a maxi-
mum of $6 per $100 per year for the period over 36 months. Id § 6213(E) (Purdon Supp.
1979).
The Pawnbrokers License Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 28 1-1 to 32 (Purdon 1968), sets
the maximum interest rate at 6% per year, but allows pawnbrokers to charge additional fees for
storage, insurance, investigation, and other services, subject to a ceiling of 2 1/2% per month
on the unpaid principal balance of a loan not more than $150 and 1 1/2% on any amount over
$150. Id § 281-12.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 5 (Purdon 1971), permits a commission merchant to charge a
maximum of 7% interest on advances made by them on goods and merchandise consigned
from out-of-state merchants.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 101-605 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
31. See Auten, A Review of the Pennsylvania Usury Law (Act No. 6 of 1974), 46 PA.
B.A.Q. 38, 39 (1975). In 1973, a period of disintermediation occurred during which "deposi-
tors withdrew their savings from institutions which traditionally provide the bulk of small
mortgage loans and placed those monies in investments which do not aid the residential mort-
gage market." Id See general y Giles, The Effect of Usury Law on the Credit Marketplace, 95
BANKING L.J. 527 (1978).
32. Act No. 6 provides that "the maximum lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of
money in an amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or less in all cases where no express
contract shall have been made for a less rate shall be six per cent per annum." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 41, § 201 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
The flexible interest rate, however, applies to all residential mortgages that are
in an original bona fide principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or less,
evidenced by a security document and secured by a lien upon real property located
within this Commonwealth containing two or fewer residential units or on which two
or fewer residential units are to be constructed and shall include such an obligation
on a residential condominium unit.
Id § 101. Under Act No. 6, "'security document' means a mortgage, deed of trust, real estate
sales contract or other document creating upon recordation a lien upon real estate." Id Regu-
lations issued pursuant to the law, however, extend the application of the act to installment
land contracts, lease purchase agreements, and any documents containing a confession ofjudg-
ment that may affect real estate. 10 PA. CODE § 7.2 (1978).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 301(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
34. See Auten, supra note 31.
35. The ability of the maximum lawful interest rate allowed by Act No. 6 to fluctuate
with economic pressures is illustrated by the changes in the legal interest rates for residential
mortgages for the final months of 1979, as follows:
September 10 3/4% 9 PA. B. 2701 (1979).
III. Problems in the Current Usury System
The legislature's piecemeal approach to the usury issue often
defeats the purpose of usury legislation. The intricacies of these stat-
utes and the variety of permitted procedures bewilder the ordinary
borrower or consumer.36 Furthermore, opportunities to circumvent
usury laws are readily available to lenders and retailers.37 The laws
also fail to adequately protect the necessitous and inexperienced bus-
inessman.38 A review of the shortcomings of usury legislation in
Pennsylvania illustrates the need for a revision of this usury system.
A. Credit and Consumers
1. Interest Rates.-The interest rate ceilings established by
usury statutes lack uniformity because maximum rates vary with the
type of loan and type of lender.39 Thus, an individual's choice of
financing determines the applicable rate ceiling. For example, a per-
son planning to make major renovations to his home has several op-
tions. If the homeowner finances the improvements through a
contractor, eight percent per annum is the maximum finance
charge.40 If he obtains an installment loan from a bank, however,
the interest rate charged cannot exceed six percent per annum.4'
A person buying an automobile is also affected by the variety of
rates. If the dealer sells a new car on an installment plan the max-
imum finance charges are six percent.42 If, on the other hand, a con-
sumer discount company provides the financing, the loan may cost
October 11% Id at 3208.
November 11 1/4% Id at 3477.
December 12% Id at 3834.
One study predicted that states with usury ceilings fixed at 10% or less would have signifi-
cant decreases in availability of funds for residential mortgages in 1979. The study reported
that "housing starts in states where usury ceilings restricted mortgage rates from reaching mar-
ket levels were found to be 10% to 30% lower than the levels of starts in nonusury states."
Thygerson & Parliment, Usury Ceilings Will Impose Huge Economic Loss in 1979, SAVINGS &
LOAN NEWS 32, 32-33 (February 1979).
36. See notes 39-71 and accompanying text infra.
37. See notes 83-130 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 72-82 and accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 13-35 and accompanying text supra.
40. Home Improvement Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-301 (Purdon 1971).
41. Banking Code of 1965, PA. STAT. ANN.,tit. 7, § 309 (Purdon 1967). The Home Im-
provement Finance Act does not include a loan if "the loan is contracted for or obtained
directly by the retail buyer from the lending institution, person or corporation . PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-102(10) (Purdon 1971).
42. The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 619(A) (Purdon
Supp. 1979), provides maximum interest rates for motor vehicles, as follows:
Class I. New motor vehicles, except those having a cash price of ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) or more and used primarily for commercial purposes and except
mobile homes, and except new trucks or truck tractors having a manufacturer's gross
vehicular weight of fifteen thousand (15,000) pounds or more and new semitrailers or
trailers designed for use in combination with truck tractors, six percent (6%) per year.
Class II. Used motor vehicles of a model designated by the manufacturer by a
the consumer up to nine and one-half percent.43
Although certain advantages and disadvantages may exist for
borrowing or buying from a specific credit source, 44 the wide dispar-
ity in rate ceilings is not justified. Indeed, the current usury system
divides the credit market to the detriment of borrowers because the
segmentation created by differentiated rate ceilings "tends to reduce
competition and introduce rigidities into the market that benefit a
few suppliers at the expense of others and work to the disadvantage
of consumers.
45
2. Cost of Credit. -While the standard definition of interest as
that sum paid for the use or loan of money" is easily understood,
calculating the cost of a credit transaction is often complicated. The
cost of a loan varies with the method used to compute interest.47
Furthermore, additional fees that lenders charge borrowers increase
the cost of credit deals.48 Therefore, a borrower is unaware of the
actual cost of a loan unless he knows both the method used to calcu-
late the interest and the additional fees imposed.
a. Computing interest. -In determining the cost of a particular
transaction, the borrower should initially examine the statute and see
whether it provides for a method of computation. Second, the bor-
rower should "evaluate the charge in light of the proper method of
computation. '49  Three methods currently used are the actuarial
year not more than two (2) years prior to the year in which the sale is made, nine
percent (9%) per year.
Class III. Older used motor vehicles of a model designated by the manufac-
turer by a year more than two (2) years prior to the year in which the sale is made,
twelve percent (12%) per year.
Class IV. New motor vehicles having a cash price of ten thousand dollars
($10,000) or more and used primarily for commercial purposes, and except new
trucks or truck tractors having a manufacturer's gross vehicular weight of fifteen
thousand (15,000) pounds or more and new semitrailers or trailers designed for use in
combination with truck tractors, seven and one-half percent (7/2%) per year.
Class V. New mobile homes, such percent established as a maximum finance
charge for mobile homes by regulation of the Federal Housing Administration, pur-
suant to the National Housing Act of June 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 1246), whether or not
the mobile home is subject to a sale on credit or loan insured or guaranteed in whole
or in part by such administration.
Class VI. New trucks and truck tractors having a manufacturer's gross vehicu-
lar weight of fifteen thousand (15,000) pounds or more and new semitrailers and
trailers designed for use in combination with truck tractors, ten percent (10%) per
year.
43. See note 29 supra for provisions of the Consumer Discount Company Act.
44. See S. PORTER, SYLVIA PORTER'S MONEYBOOK 90-107 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
MONEYBOOK].
45. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.201, comment 1(2) (1974 Act) [hereinafter
cited as UCCC].
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (4th ed. 1968).
47. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 55-63 and accompanying text infra.
49. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
32-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER PROTECTION IN PENNSYLVANIA].
method,5° the discount method, 51 and the add-on method.52  While
the actuarial method is used to obtain the "true" interest,53 the other
methods result in an actual interest rate higher than that agreed to by
the parties. If the loan is on an installment plan, the actual interest
rate under the discount and add-on methods is nearly double the
stated rate of interest because although the lender computes interest
on the entire amount of the loan, the borrower does not possess all
the principal for the full life of the loan. 4 Since many people rely on
the stated interest rate, they are not aware of the true cost of the
transaction.
b. Additionalfees. -Beyond interest fees and finance charges,
lenders impose an assortment of additional fees on borrowers and
50. The actuarial method computed on the declining balance of a loan is cited as an
annual percentage rate (A.P.R.). This method is used to obtain the simple interest. Id at 33.
For conversion tables used to determine the correct annual percentage rate, see D. THORNDIKE
& D. CAREY, THE THORNDIKE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL TABLES (1979).
51. Under the discount method, the interest or finance charge is subtracted from the
principal of the loan at the time the borrower receives the money. Therefore, if a person
borrows $100 at 6%, he receives $94. MONEYBOOK, supra note 44, at 112. The formula used to
determine the actual rate of interest of a discounted loan is as follows: When the stated princi-
pal is $X and the stated interest is i, the highest interest deductible is $(X/i). The amount
actually loaned is $X minus the interest deduction or $(X-X/i). The actual rate of interest (I)
is computed from the formula, X/i=I(X-X/i). If the stated rate of interest is 6% and the stated
principal is $100, I is computed: 100/.06=1 (100-100/.06) or 1=6.38%. Comment, UsurylImpi-
cations of Front-End Interest and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748, 751 n.25 (1975).
52. If a lender employs the add-on method, he adds the finance charge or interest to the
principal at the time the loan is made. The borrower pays the total of the two. For example, if
a borrower obtains a $100 loan at 6%, he repays $106. MONEYBOOK, supra note 44, at 112.
53. CONSUMER PROTECTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 49, at 33.
54. For example, if a borrower obtains a $100 loan at 6% interest repayable in one year in
a single payment, his actual interest rate is 6%. If the lender uses the add-on method, however,
and the borrower repays the loan in 12 monthly installments, the actual interest rate is 11.08%.
This result occurs because in the first transaction the borrower had the use of the entire loan
for the full period of the loan, but in the second transaction the borrower repaid part of the
principal in each installment. By the 12th month of the loan he only had 1/12 of the principal
for his use.
The following table illustrates the effect of the add-on method for other interest rates for a
one year loan.
Stated Interest Rate Actual Interest Rate
$4.00 per $100 or 4% per year 7.4%
$4.50 per $100 or 4 1/2% per year 8.31
$5.00 per $100 or 5% per year 9.23
$5.50 per $100 or 5 1/2% per year 10.15
$6.00 per $100 or 6% per year 11.08
$8.00 per $100 or 8% per year 14.8
$10.00 per $100 or 10% per year 18.5
$12.00 per $100 or 12% per year 22.2
MONEYBOOK, supra note 44, at 112.
The use of the discount method exaggerates the stated interest rate more than the add-on
method because the interest has been subtracted from the principal. The following table con-
verts discount rates into the actual interest rate.
Stated Interest Rate Actual Interest Rate
$5 per $100 per year 9.57%
$6 per $100 per year 11.58
$7 per $100 per year 13.61
$8 per $100 per year 15.68
MONEYBOOK, supra note 44, at 113.
consumers. While statutes permit some of these charges,55 lenders
charge other fees without statutory authorization, 6 and consumers
must consider these fees in determining the cost of credit.
Although fees to cover the costs of a credit transaction should be
permitted,57 the legislature should prevent lenders and retailers from
disguising interest by renaming it. Lenders cannot justify additional
fees as a means "to cover services rendered when, from a practical
point of view, most loans are already computed with additional
charges included to reimburse the lender for his expenses."58 Fur-
thermore, most statutes permit lenders to charge consumers some of
the costs of the transaction. 9 For example, the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act 6° allows a dealer or financing agency to charge the con-
sumer insurance costs; fees for filing, recording, or satisfying a lien
or installment sales contract; fees for notorization; and other official
fees voluntarily agreed on by the buyer.6' Since the dealer does not
profit from these fees, he may collect them.
Additional fees to a loan, however, may render a transaction
usurious. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court long ago observed, "It
is, indeed, wholly immaterial under what form or pretence usury is
concealed, if it can by any means be discovered our courts will refuse
55. See, e.g., Banking Code of 1965, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 309(0) (Purdon 1967); Con-
sumer Discount Company Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6213(M) (Purdon 1967); Pawnbrokers
License Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 281-12(A) (Purdon 1968).
56. See Comment, A Comprehensive View of California Usury Law, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 166,
199-202 (1974). "Typical additional charges include, but are not limited to, loan origination
and closing expenses, inspection fees, title examination fees, insurance charges, broker's fees,
insurance fees, attorney's fees, appraisal fees, recording fees and supervision of construction
work fees." Id at 200-01 (footnotes omitted).
57. Cf. Mondik v. DiSimo, 386 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d
Cir. 1975) (delivery and packing charges not "finance charge" under Truth in Lending Act).
58. Comment, supra note 56, at 201.
59. See note 55 supra.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (Purdon 1965).
61. The statute prevents inflated insurance costs by providing that:
The cost of the premium on such insurance to the buyer shall not be in excess of the
amount of the premium which others are required to pay to such insurance company
for similar coverage, and in no event in excess of rates established in the then current
published applicable manual of a recognized standard insurance rating bureau, or
the rates fixed by authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Id § 617(C).
The Act further provides:
In addition to the cost of insurance premiums authorized in the preceding sec-
tion of this act, the seller of a motor vehicle under an installment sale contract may
require the buyer to pay certain other costs incurred in the sale of a motor vehicle
under such contract as follows:
I. Fees, payable to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for filing a lien or
encumbrance on the certificate of title to a motor vehicle sold under an installment
sale contract or collateral security thereto.
2. Fees, payable to a public official, for filing or recording and satisfying or
releasing the installment sale contract or instruments securing the buyer's obligation.
3. Fees for notarization required in connection with the filing and recording or
satisfying and releasing a mortgage, judgment lien or encumbrance.
Id § 618(A). Section 618(B) covers other fees.
to enforce its payment."62 Under this principle, courts have frus-
trated lenders' attempts to evade the usury laws by charging addi-
tional fees.63
3. Consumer Indifference.-The wide range of maximum in-
terest rates and finance charges bewilder most consumers, and the
different methods of computing interest further impede borrowers'
abilities to comprehend or use this technical information. Borrowers
and consumers are tempted to overextend their credit if they fail to
perceive the probability of default and its consequences for them-
selves and their families. If the borrower underestimates either the
chance of default or the hardship that might result he will demand
more credit than he would were he better informed.' The complex-
ity of usury laws increases the likelihood that a consumer will be
unable to anticipate the consequences of his actions.
Consumer insensitivity to interest rates and finance charges fur-
ther decreases the effectiveness of usury laws. Studies65 document
consumer indifference to interest rates both prior and subsequent to
the passage of the Truth in Lending Act.66 Although the purpose of
the Act was "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, '67 it
has had inconsiderable effect on consumers.68 If the statutes do not
increase consumer knowledge, the laws fail to adequately protect
consumers and borrowers.
The blame for consumer indifference falls on several consumer
practices. Frequently, consumers shop for and decide to buy a prod-
uct before they even consider the terms of a credit sale. 69 Another
62. Hartranft v. Uhlinger, 115 Pa. 270, 273, 8 A. 244, 246 (1886).
63. See, e.g., Richman v. Watkins, 376 Pa. 510, 103 A.2d 688 (1954) (broker's fee charged
by lender); In re Gerber's Estate, 337 Pa. 108, 9 A.2d 438 (1939) (commission for sale of bonds
by bank); Kelter v. American Bankers Fin. Co., 306 Pa. 483, 160 A. 127 (1932) (investigation
fee). Cf. Klein v. Mathewson, 384 Pa. 298, 121 A.2d 577 (1956) (broker's fee not usurious
when broker was not lender).
64. Wallace, supra note 10, at 472.
65. See Kripke, Gesture andReality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1969); Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test ofhe Effi-
cacy ofthe Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. FINANCE 1143 (1971); White & Munger, Consumer
Sensitivity to Interest Rates. An Empirical Study ofNew-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 1207, 1239 (1971); Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 407-20; Comment, The Impact of Truth in Lending on
Automobile Financing - An Empirical Study, 4 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 179, 195-98 (1971).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
67. Id § 1601(a).
68. Landers & Chandler, The Truth in Lending Act and Variable-Rate Mortgages and
Balloon Notes, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 35. "In fact, evidence suggests that,
although there may be some modest improvement in consumer understanding of the cost of
credit since [Truth in Lending] was enacted, the information seems to have had a minimal
impact - if any at all - in fostering more informed credit decisions or better shopping for
credit." Id at 65.
69. White & Munger, supra note 65, at 1210.
explanation is that consumers, already heavily in debt, disregard the
cost of credit because installment sales allow them to purchase goods
they desire but would otherwise forego.7"
The task of educating consumers is a difficult one. Although
consumer awareness may not have increased because of the Truth in
Lending Act, "[sitandardization of terminology, over the long run,
may be extremely important for consumer understanding of credit
transactions, and in encouraging consumers to use the information
as part of the decision-making process."'" If uniformity does lead to
increased consumer knowledge, all Pennsylvania usury legislation
should employ uniform terminology.
B. Unprotected Transactions
Another problem connected with the usury system in Penn-
sylvania is its failure to set maximum interest rates and finance
charges on certain transactions. This deficiency results from the ex-
emption of installment sales from the general usury law.7 2 Statutes,
however, have remedied this defect in the area of installment sales to
consumers.7 3 In addition, regulations have included installment
sales of residential real estate within the protection of the Residential
Mortgage Act.74 Nevertheless, installment sales to individuals for
commercial, business, or agricultural purposes continue to fall
within the "time-price" exception to the usury laws.75
Statutory protection should extend to those necessitous and in-
experienced businessmen who are engaged in transactions for these
presently excepted purposes. Without legislative action, courts "will
leave these businessmen, who are presumed to know what they are
doing when they consummate [installment] purchase agreements, to
their bargain."76 The court's presumption, however, is not always
justified, because not all businessmen and farmers have experience
in obtaining credit. A farmer working the family farm may need
70. Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges- A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1285, 1321 (1966).
71. Landers, Some Refections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 669, 687. See Klass
& Chairnoff, Truth in Lending The Administrative View, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 43, 53-54 (1969); Sher-
rard, Truth in Lending: The Lender's Viewpoint, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 59, 69-70 (1969).
72. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
74. In interpreting the Residential Mortgage Act (Act No. 6), the attorney general con-
cluded that an installment land sale contract in which title to the land remained in the owner
until final payment was not covered by either the general usury rate of 6% or the flexible
interest rate ceiling for residential mortgages. He thus recommended that the legislature
amend the Act to include installment land sales. PA. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 29, 4 PA. B. 1389,
1390 (1974). The defect in Act No. 6 was corrected by regulations made by the Department of
Banking pursuant to the Act. See note 32 supra.
75. Equipment Fin., Inc. v. Grarmas, 207 Pa. Super. Ct. 363, 218 A.2d 81 (1966).
76. Id at 369, 218 A.2d at 84. The court noted that if the purchasers were a corporation
rather than a partnership, they would have been prevented from asserting the usury defense.
/d n.5.
protection when he tries to purchase farming equipment on an in-
stallment plan. A young man starting his own business may use in-
stallment purchases to obtain machinery, supplies, and products.
"[T]he very small businessman is really in many respects indistin-
guishable from the consumer."77
Several proposed statutes would protect these necessitous and
inexperienced individuals. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC)78 sets maximum rates on credit transactions for agricultural
purposes.79 Another proposal, the National Consumer Act (NCA),8°
extends its provisions to financing for agricultural purposes and to
purchases of business equipment for use in the business. 8' In addi-
tion, the original version of the UCCC applied to any consumer re-
lated transaction not in excess of $25,000 if made to a person not a
corporation.12 This proposal would certainly suffice to remedy a de-
fect that the legislature has ignored.
C Evasion of Usury Statutes
Although usury statutes exempt many types of credit transac-
tions,83 lenders employ various techniques to escape the interest rate
77. Benfield, supra note 17, at 881.
78. The UCCC proposes to bring the entire consumer credit process into a comprehen-
sive statute and to correct problems caused by piecemeal legislation and outright neglect. Al-
though the original version was criticized as being creditor-oriented, the 1974 revision deals
with that criticism. Boyd, The Revised Uniform Consumer Credit Code as a Replacement for
Piecemeal Consumer Legislation: The Arizona Context, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. I, 1-2 (1976). See
generally Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387
(1968); Leary, Commentary on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 298 (1972);
LoPucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumer's Code - or Lender's Code, 12 U.
FLA. L. REV. 335 (1970); Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of the Unform Consumer
Credit Code, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1974).
79. UCCC § 1.301(4) (1974 version).
80. National Consumer Act (first final draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as NCA]. The NCA
was drafted to deal with consumer credit problems that resulted from omissions and weak-
nesses of the UCCC. Id preface. For comparisons of the UCCC and NCA, see Kass, Uniform
Consumer Credit Code and National Consumer Act: Some Objective Comparisons, 8 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 82 (1971) and Comment, An Analysis of the Unform Consumer Credit Code and
the National Consumer Act, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 889 (1971).
81. NCA § 1.301(8) (first final draft 1969). The NCA defines "consumer" as "a person
other than an organization who seeks or acquires (a) business equipment for use in his busi-
ness, or (b) real or personal property, services, money or credit for personal, family, household
or agricultural purposes." Id
82. UCCC §§ 2.602, 3.602 (1968 version).
83. A major statutory exception to the usury laws is the corporate exception. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1313 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See notes 109-23 and accompanying text infra.
In addition to the corporate exception, the Residential Mortgage Act (Act No. 6) provides
several exceptions to the general usury ceiling of 6% and the flexible interest rate applicable to
residential mortgages. These interest rate ceilings do not apply to
(i) an obligation to pay a sum of money in an original bona fide principal amount of
more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); (ii) an obligation to pay a sum of money
in an original bona fide principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or less,
evidenced by a security document and secured by a lien upon real property, other
than residential real property as defined in this act; (iii) to a loan to a person subject
to the act of April 27, 1927 (P.L. 404, No. 260), entitled "An act prohibiting corpora-
tions from pleading usury as a defense," section 313 of the act of May 5, 1933 (P.L.
364, No. 106), known as the "Business Corporation Law," or Title 15 Pa. C.S. section
ceilings of those loans and installment sales that fall within the scope
of usury legislation.84 Usury laws form part of the public policy of
the Commonwealth and should not be circumvented.85 Therefore,
courts must examine the substance of a transaction to determine the
true intent. 86 An examination of attempts to evade interest rate ceil-
ings indicates ways in which revisions of the usury laws would make
these statutes more effective.
1. Overlapping Laws. -The problem with overlapping laws is
not the overlap, but rather the resulting opportunity for circumven-
tion of legislative intent by lenders and retailers who finance credit
transactions. While all credit transactions are affected by statutory
overlaps, this comment concentrates on motor vehicle financing. Al-
though the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act (MVSFA) 87 was di-
rected at "excessive interest rates and oppressive transactions" in
motor vehicle financing,8 8 retailers and lenders continue to use vari-
ous methods to obtain higher rates of interest permitted under other
statutes. If these methods are successful in circumventing the
MYSFA, lenders can charge higher interest, escape disclosure re-
quirements, and retain defenses to warrantee claims.89
One method, "dragging the body," is described as a "technique
whereby an automobile dealer who is unwilling or unable to extend
credit to a-potential customer persuades the customer to obtain a
7544; or (iv) an unsecured, noncollateralized loan in excess of thirty-five thousand
dollars ($35,000); or (v) business loans the principal amount of which is in excess of
ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 301(f) (Purdon Supp. 1979). To qualify for a business loan exception,
the credit must be used in a business enterprise. In addition, the regulations require that "[tihe
borrower exercises actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise in which the
funds are to be utilized [and] signs an affidavit under penalty of perjury setting forth the in-
tended use of proceeds." 10 PA. CODE § 7.2. If provisions of other statutes are inconsistent
with Act No. 6, the other statute prevails. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 604 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Thus, in determining the maximum interest rate for a given loan, one should
first ascertain whether the loan is goverened by any statute other.than Act No. 6. If
not, Act No. 6 applies. If the loan is not a residential mortgage, a loan exempted
from interest rate ceilings or a loan to which federal law applies, the interest rate
under Act No. 6 will be 6%.
Auten, supra note 31, at 53.
A third exception allows parties to make advances of money in the amount of $5000 or
more, repayable on demand, in which a negotiable instrument is pledged as collateral security,
and to contract for and collect any interest agreed on in writing. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § I
(Purdon 1971).
84. See Comment, supra note 56, at 198-215.
85. Richman v. Watkins, 376 Pa. 510, 103 A.2d 688 (1954); Simpson v. Penn Discount
Corp., 335 Pa. 172, 5 A.2d 796 (1939); Moll v. Lafferty, 302 Pa. 354, 153 A. 557 (1931).
86. Simpson v. Penn Discount Corp., 335 Pa. 172, 5 A.2d 796 (1939). "As usury is gener-
ally accompanied by subterfuge and circumvention of one kind or another to present the color
of legality, it is the duty of the court to examine the substance of the transaction as well as its
form .... ." d. at 176, 5 A.2d at 798.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (Purdon 1965).
88. Waterbor, Inc. v. Livingood, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 610, 615, 117 A.2d 790, 792 (1955).
89. Anderson v. Automobile Fund, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 21, 391 A.2d 642, 652 (1978)
(opinion in support of reversal).
loan from a specified lender, usually a consumer discount company,
with which the dealer has established a prior understanding."9 This
practice inhibits the consumer from shopping for other financing.
Usually, the consumer does not know that the lender financially re-
wards the dealer. In addition, the finance company makes the check
payable to the dealer and the customer, which assures the dealer that
the consumer will not buy elsewhere.9
Another method of circumventing the provisions of the MVSFA
is to have the forms of the bank or discount company at the dealer's
office. When a buyer purchases on credit, the dealer completes the
forms as though he were financing the transaction.92 The consumer
leaves without suspecting that he has received a loan from a finance
company. Whichever method a lender uses, consumers pay higher
finance charges because rates under the Consumer Discount Com-
pany Act (CDCA)93 are higher than under the MVSFA.94
In Anderson v. Automobile Fund,9 5 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in a split decision96 unsatisfactorily decided the issue of
whether "dragging the body" was a permitted practice. In that case,
plaintiff's husband went to a car dealer to purchase a used car. After
the husband indicated that he would need financing and mentioned
a bank, the dealer dissuaded him from applying at the bank and
encouraged him to borrow at Avco Financial Services. The car
proved to be a "lemon" and was inoperative the day after plaintiff
took possession. When plaintiff sought to have the car repaired
under the warranty, the dealer refused to comply.97 The judges for
affirmance determined that since the transaction met the terms of the
CDCA, it was excluded from MVSFA coverage.98
90. Id. at 15, 391 A.2d at 649. For this service to the discount company, the automobile
dealer would often receive a referral fee. Id
91. Id at 21, 391 A.2d at 652. See Comment, "Dragging the Body"- DeceptiveAutomo-
bile Financing in Pennsylvania: With Proposed Legislative Remedies, 34 U. PTT. L. REV. 429
(1973).
Another variation is not so much "dragging the body" as it is "delivering it."
Located on the premises (or within a phone call's distance) is an agent of the in-
dependent finance company or bank. Once C has selected the car and made known
his desire to finance the balance, he is introduced to the agent of the third-party credit
extender. The agent is usually introduced as M who handles all the paperwork, and
rarely is he introduced as the agent of a third-party financing agency, legally unre-
lated to the auto dealership.
d at 433.
92. Paul R. Webber, Inc. v. Duffy, 10 Leb. 475 (Pa. C.P. 1965). See Comment, supra note
91, at 433.
93. See note 29 supra.
94. See note 42 supra.
95. 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 391 A.2d 642 (1978).
96. Judge Van der Voort's opinion in support of affirmance and remand was joined by
Judges Cercone and Price. Judge Spaeth's opinion in support of reversal was joined by Presi-
dent Judge Jacobs and Judge Hoffman. Former President Judge Watkins did not participate
in the decision.
97. Id at 15-17, 391 A.2d at 649-50.
98. Id at 9-11, 391 A.2d at 646-47.
Precedent, however, does not support the Anderson decision, be-
cause several courts have maintained that if the finance company
knew that the financing was for the purchase of a motor vehicle, the
provisions of the MVSFA apply.99 If, however, the transaction
between finance company and consumer was not for the purpose of
circumventing the MVSFA and the consumer sought financing from
the discount company without inducement by the dealer, the trans-
action was not an attempt to evade the law.
2. Collateral Agreements. -Another problem faces the usury
system when, in addition to a loan agreement, the parties enter a
simultaneous agreement as a condition of the loan. Generally, an
agreement between two parties entered into as a condition of a loan
is not usurious if the agreement is mutually beneficial and the loan is
merely incidental. This rule applies even though the agreement
would not have been made without the loan.'00
If, however, the agreement is part of the bargain for the loan,
the transaction violates the usury laws. Courts look beyond the form
of the transaction to its substance in determining whether the trans-
action is usurious.' Although "[t]he inquiry is not merely whether
lands, goods or securities were sold for more than their market value,
but whether the property was sold, and bought above its market
price, as part of the bargain for the loan of money,' 0 2 the sale of
property above its market value may indicate a usurious arrange-
ment.
03
Courts have also discredited the sale and leaseback technique as
99. See, e.g., Casey v. Philadelphia Auto Sales Co., 428 Pa. 155, 236 A.2d 800 (1968);
First Nat'l Bank of Millville v. Horwatt, 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 581, 162 A.2d 60 (1960); Paul R.
Webber, Inc. v. Duffy, 10 Leb. 475 (Pa. C.P. 1965). Cf. Transnational Consumer Discount Co.
v. Weaver, 52 Erie 4 (Pa. C.P. 1968) (attempt to use direct loan to circumvent Home Improve-
ment Finance Act); Iron and Glass Bank v. Franz, 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 419 (Allegheny County
C.P. 1978) (attempt to circumvent finance charge limits of the Goods and Services Installment
Sales Act).
100. Bokser v. Lewis, 383 Pa. 507, 119 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956) (contract
to purchase stock at less than face value); Freedom Oil Works Co. v. Williams, 302 Pa. 51, 152
A. 741 (1930) (contract to purchase gas and oil).
In Freedom Oil, the court declared that
[Ilf, irrespective of the loan, the parties desire to enter into a contract for their mutual
benefit, the mere fact that, as part of the arrangement, a loan is made from one to
another at a legal rate of interest to enable him to perform his part, does not consti-
tute usury though the contract would not have been made without the loan ....
Id at 55, 152 A. at 743. In addition to a mortgage secured by real estate upon which a service
station was established, the parties in Freedom Oil entered into a purchase agreement in which
the borrower agreed to purchase exclusively from the lender "all gasoline and oil used or sold
at the service station in question for a minimum period of three years and until the loan should
be fully repaid." 1d at 53, 152 A. at 742.
101. Simpson v. Penn Discount Corp., 335 Pa. 172, 176, 5 A.2d 796, 798 (1939).
102. Earnest v. Hoskins, 100 Pa. 551, 560 (1882).
103. In Earnest v. Hoskins, 100 Pa. 551 (1882), and Fitzsimons v. Baum, 44 Pa. 32 (1862),
the transactions were usurious because of the exorbitant price paid for real estate.
a means of evading the usury laws. 104 If the transaction creates a
debtor-creditor relationship, the court finds a loan.' 0 5 For example,
if the parties attempt to characterize a transaction as the sale and
leaseback of the borrower's assets, the courts maintain that the ar-
rangement is a loan and not a sale although the word "loan" was not
used. 106
Performance by the lender of extra services in addition to provi-
sion of the loan itself is another legitimate method by which the
lender can receive compensation greater than that permitted by legal
rates. 107 Payment for these additional services is not considered usu-
rious even though the parties do not separate the cost between the
services and interest. 1
08
Although collateral agreements may allow evasion of interest
rate ceilings, these methods may benefit the parties at times. If the
transaction, however, is merely for the purpose of escaping usury
restrictions, the legislature and courts should take steps to stop the
practice. Statutory restrictions on sale and leasebacks are one possi-
ble solution to the problem. Although the legislature may enact a
law dealing with collateral agreements, the courts will continue to
make the final determination of the true nature of these transactions.
3. Incorporation to A void Usury. -The Pennsylvania legisla-
ture has followed a majority of states 109 in resolving that "[n]o busi-
ness corporation shall plead or set up usury, or the taking of more
than six percent interest, as a defense to any action brought against it
."' The rationale for the "corporate exception" is that corpo-
104. See Equitable Credit Co. v. Stephany, 155 Pa. Super. Ct. 261, 38 A.2d 412 (1944);
Saunders v. Resnick, 142 Pa. Super. Ct. 457, 16 A.2d 676 (1940). A sale-leaseback is a transac-
tion "under which, by prearranged agreement, a lease relationship is created upon acquisition
of property or upon completion of improvements upon the property." PRACTISING LAW INSTI-
TUTE, Sale and Leaseback Financing - 1973 xv (1973). See generally Podell, The Application
of Usury Laws to Modern Real Estate Transactions, I REAL EST. L.J. 136, 145-47 (1972).
105. See Equitable Credit Co. v. Stephany, 155 Pa. Super. Ct. 261, 263, 38 A.2d 412, 413
(1944) (sale and leaseback of automobile). Cf. Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. 55,
123 A. 650 (1924) (bankrupt's trustee entitled to possession of goods involved in a sale and
leaseback).
106. Saunders v. Resnick, 142 Pa. Super. Ct. 457, 461, 16 A.2d 676, 677 (1940).
107. See Rossmassler v. Spielberger, 270 Pa. 30, 112 A. 876 (1921) (supervision and man-
agement of borrower's business); Heist v. Blaisdell, 198 Pa. 377, 48 A. 259 (1901) (services
rendered); Righter, Cowgill & Co. v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 99 Pa. 289 (1882) (care and
custody of collateral).
108. Heist v. Blaisdell, 198 Pa. 377, 48 A. 259 (1901). Agreements to pay a share of the
profits in lieu of interest are also permitted. These loan transactions are not usurious if they
are for a share of the profits only. Scott v. Kennedy (No. 1), 201 Pa. 462, 51 A. 384 (1902). If
the lender, however, takes a share of the profits in addition to interest, the loan is usurious.
Scott v. Kennedy (No. 2), 201 Pa. 470, 51 A. 385 (1902). See generally Podell, supra note 104,
at 143-45.
109. See I CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) $ 510.
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1313 (Purdon Supp. 1979). The corporate exception statute
does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Brierley v.
Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929), af'd, 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 897 (1931).
rations lack the characteristics of a needy or inexperienced borrower.
Corporations are perceived as sophisticated in business matters I "
and not susceptible to financial coercion. 1 2  Furthermore, their
shareholders possess limited liability."' Therefore, corporations do
not need the protection of usury laws.
The problem with the corporate exception arises in credit trans-
actions in which a lender requires the individual to incorporate prior
to making the loan for the purpose of avoiding interest rate ceilings.
New York courts allow the parties to make their own agreement in
the absence of fraud. 14 Many other states have adopted this liberal
view toward incorporation to avoid usury restrictions." 5 Some juris-
dictions, however, examine the facts of the transaction more closely.
If the corporate form is used merely to evade usury law ceilings, the
borrower may assert the usury defense." 6
The case of Walnut Discount Co. v. Weiss. 7 illustrates the Penn-
sylvania position. In that case, individual borrowers owed an ex-
isting obligation to a consumer discount company. As a condition to
refinancing, the discount company required the borrowers to incor-
porate, and the loan to the new corporation named the individuals as
guarantors of the corporate note, which was at an interest rate be-
yond that allowed by law.' 18
The superior court found that the individuals were the principal
obligors and that the new corporation was merely a surety for the
purpose of avoiding the usury defense. The court construed the stat-
utory exception "to preclude the defence of usury only in the case of
I 11. Note, Stemming Abuses of Corporate Exemptions from the Usury Laws: A Legislative
and Judicial Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REV. 91, 92 (1973).
112. See Comment, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23 MD. L. REV. 51, 55
(1962).
Regarding [usury] laws as the means adopted by the state to protect people against
their own weakness, and against the power of money lenders, we must suppose that
corporations are excluded from this protection, because they have not the same need
of it that individuals have . . . .The declaration of the law is that corporations need
no protection of this sort, and the state will afford them none. Money lenders can
have no undue influence over them, and the law does not interpose its suspicion
between them in their dealings.
Bock v. Lauman, 24 Pa. 435, 448 (1855) (interpreting New York law).
113. See Note, supra note I l, at 92. See generally All Purpose Fin. Corp. v. D'Andrea,
427 Pa. 341, 350, 235 A.2d 808, 813 (1967) (dissenting opinion); Bock v. Lauman, 24 Pa. 435,
448 (1855).
114. Eg., Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930). See generally Comment,
Incorporation toAvoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 1390 (1968); Note, supra note 11I;
Comment, Using a "Dummy" Corporate Borrower Creates Usury and Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw.
L.J. 437 (1974) [hereinafter cited as "Dummy" Corporate Borrower].
115. See, e.g., Gangadean v. Flori Inv. Co., II Ariz. App. 512, 466 P.2d 63 (1970); Rabino-
wich v. Eliasberg, 159 Md. 655, 152 A. 437 (1930); Country Motors, Inc. v. Friendly Fin. Corp.,
13 Wis. 2d 475, 109 N.W.2d 137 (1961).
116. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., I I I So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); In re
Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956); Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89
A.2d 654 (1952).
117. 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 161, 208 A.2d 26 (1965).
118. Id at 162-64, 208 A.2d at 26-27.
a bona fide corporate loan and not to extend its effect to loans to
individuals who, though on the face of the documents endorsers or
guarantors of a corporate obligation, are in fact the real debtors."" 9
The approach adopted by Pennsylvania courts has received crit-
icism for not giving individuals adequate protection.' 20 The liberali-
zation of incorporation laws further augments the problem of
incorporating to circumvent usury statutes.
A small business may readily be transformed into a corporation
without a like transformation of its ownership structure into a cor-
porate management capable of dealing intelligently and realisti-
cally at the bargaining table. A usurious loan may be concealed
by requiring an individual to incorporate as a condition of the
transaction, but the element of "voluntariness" is notably lacking,
and the individual . . . has lost none of his vulnerability.
12 1
An amendment to the corporate exception statute would give
increased protection to individuals involved in a corporate loan.
This amendment should prohibit lenders from requiring individuals
to incorporate as a condition of obtaining a loan. Furthermore, all
individuals, regardless of their designation on the loan agreement,
should qualify for the usury defense.12 2 These steps would increase
the protection that usury legislation gives to necessitous borrow-
ers. 123
4. Forum Shopping by Foreign Lenders. -The general usury
laws of Pennsylvania are inapplicable to contracts made and to be
performed outside the Commonwealth, and when a loan or debt is
made payable at a specific place, the laws of that place govern the
permitted interest rate. 124 Under these interpretations of usury legis-
lation, out-of-state lenders and retailers attempt to charge Penn-
119. Id at 166, 208 A.2d at 28. In related matters, the courts have held that the usury
defense is not available to individual sureties, All Purpose Fin. Corp. v. D'Andrea, 427 Pa.
341, 235 A.2d 808 (1967), and individual guarantors, Raby v. Commercial Banking Corp., 208
Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 220 A.2d 659 (1966), of bona fide corporate loans.
120. See All Purpose Fin. Corp. v. D'Andrea, 427 Pa. 341, 349-52, 235 A.2d 808, 812-14
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
121. Note, supra note I 1, at 93.
122. See All Purpose Fin. Corp. v. D'Andrea, 427 Pa. 341, 351-52, 235 A.2d 808, 813
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
123. The case-by-case approach has been recommended as the most desirable approach.
Factors which courts should consider include the length of time the corporation has
been in existence, the corporation's principal assets, the purpose for which the loan
has been obtained, the reasonableness of the rate, and the business perception of the
individual involved. A court should not hesitate to expose the "sham" corporation
where ignoring it would seriously undermine the basic policies of the usury laws. On
the other hand, such a case-by-case analysis should not invalidate a transaction every
time it was discovered that a corporation had been formed to legalize a usurious loan,
for courts should look to such factors as the sophistication of the borrower and the
purpose of the loan to determine which policies weigh most heavily in the balance.
Note, supra note 11, at 105. For a discussion recommending the adoption of the New York
approach, see "Dummy" Corporate Borrower, supra note 114, at 450-51.
124. Clark v. Searight, 135 Pa. 173, 175-76 (1890). See Campbell v. Hunt, 60 Pa. Super.
Ct. 332 (1915); Dittler Bros., Inc. v. Brunswick, 92 Montg. 218 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
sylvania residents interest rates and finance charges permitted in
another jurisdiction.'25 If the consumer is in the state and the per-
formance of the agreement occurs in the state, however, the Com-
monwealth has an interest in protecting the consumer. 126 Therefore,
usury legislation may prevent foreign merchants from exceeding rate
ceilings that were determined by the legislature to be reasonable and
necessary to safeguard consumers.
While other usury statutes do not address the issue of forum
shopping, the provisions of the Goods and Services Installment Sales
Act 127 prevent this type of evasion. If the seller offers or agrees in
Pennsylvania to sell to a resident buyer or if the resident buyer ac-
cepts or makes the offer to buy in the state, Pennsylvania is the situs
of the installment contract and the transaction is subject to the
Act. 128
Although foreign retailers asserted that the provision violated
the commerce clause, the judicial view is that "the national interest
in the free flow of interstate commerce does not outweigh the interest
of Pennsylvania in protecting its consumers from unreasonable serv-
ice charge rates on installment credit accounts."' 29 The legislature
should increase the effectiveness of the usury system by extending
the protection of this provision to other types of credit transac-
tions. 
30
IV. A New Usury Code for Pennsylvania
Revision of the usury laws could alleviate many of the problems
resulting from the current system.' 31 Although a consolidated and
comprehensive usury code is not the only method available to cor-
125. See Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 379 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Pa. 1974). Aldens was a general
retail merchandise mail order business organized and located in Illinois. The company at-
tempted to impose a 21% annual rate, which was allowed by Illinois law, on Pennsylvania
customers. Id at 525.
126. Id at 530.
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
128. Id. § 1103. This rule applies regardless of provisions in the contract that denote an-
other state as the situs of the contract. In addition, the act subjects any solicitations or commu-
nications to sell or buy crossing state lines between a retail seller and a resident buyer to the
provisions of the Act. Id
129. Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 379 F. Supp. 521, 530 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
130. The Commonwealth, however, cannot apply its usury laws to an out-of-state national
bank since they are "instrumentalities of the Federal government." Davis v. Elmira Sav.
Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
Section 85 of the National Bank Act provides, in the pertinent part, that "[a]ny association
may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills
of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State,
Territory, or District where the bank is located ...." 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976). In Marquette
Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 99 S. Ct. 540 (1978), the Supreme
Court interpreted the statute to allow a national bank to charge its out-of-state customers the
legal rate allowed by the state in which the bank was located. Id at 546-48.
131. See notes 36-130 and accompanying text supra.
rect current deficiencies,' 32 the enactment of a consolidated code is
the most practical option. Collection of all usury provisions in one
code would improve an attorney's ability to advise his clients'3 3 and
would increase consumers' abilities to compare credit costs.' 34  Re-
gardless of the method chosen to revise the usury laws, correction of
the existing problems would have widespread benefits.'35
A. Standardization of Usury Provisions
A revision of the usury laws should standardize terminology
and practices. As consumers become educated about uniform laws
they will become more sensitive and aware of the costs of credit
transactions. If the increased knowledge of consumers alerts them to
the possible consequences of a loan or installment purchase, they
will avoid hardships resulting from overextending their credit.
36
The Residential Mortgage Act 37 provides an example of the
most feasible method of language standardization and interest calcu-
lation. While the act only applies to those loans and credit transac-
tions for residential real estate, 3 ' the provisions of the Act could be
incorporated into a consolidated usury statute.
The Act prohibits lenders from receiving a greater loan yield 
39
132. A recent recommendation to prevent "dragging the body" tactics proposed to amend
the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act by prohibiting a dealer from suggesting a source of loan
funds, even if the buyer requests guidance. Comment, supra note 91, at 444-45.
133. One of the basic assumptions of the UCCC is that "consumer credit legislation
should be contained in one law so that any attorney can quickly and effectively advise his
consumer client. ... UCCC preface (1968 act).
134. See notes 39-71 and accompanying text supra.
135. If borrowers default because of their inability to comprehend their financial situation,
lenders face increased costs. Therefore, "[a] statute which insures the creditor the prompt and
certain repayment of his money works to the advantage of the consumer. For the lower the
risk taken by the creditor, the less charged for the money lent." Edmonds, Virginia Law of
Interest and Usury, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 77, 109 (1975).
136. The Truth in Lending Act is intended to be a consumer education tool. "The single
major objective of Truth in Lending is to make consumers wiser users and better shoppers for
credit. To succeed, it is vital that all consumers become aware of what it really costs to borrow
money or make purchases on credit." Klass & Chairnoff, supra note 71, at 53.
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 101-605 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
138. See note 32 supra.
139. "Loan yield" means the annual rate of return obtained by a residential mortgage
lender from a residential mortgage debtor over the term of the loan and shall be
determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary of Banking. Such
regulations shall establish the method for calculating such rate of return and shall
provide that the finance charge be amortized over the contract term of the loan.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary of Banking issued regulations providing that "[tihe loan
yield shall be computed as the annual percentage rate is computed in accordance with section
226.5(b), (c), and (d) of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226, but using the definition of finance
charge provided for in the act." 10 PA. CODE § 7.3(b).
For purposes of determining the loan yield,
"Finance charge" means the total cost of a loan or charge for the use of money,
including any extensions or grant of credit regardless of the characterization of the
same and includes any interest, time price differential, points, premiums, finder's fees,
and other charges levied by the residential mortgage lender directly or indirectly
than the maximum interest rate. 140 It also specifies the charges that
constitute actual settlement costs. 14 1 Therefore, the loan yield in-
cludes any expense or cost beyond the actual settlement costs.
Since the Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure of credit
terms for transactions "primarily for personal, family, household, or
agricultural purposes,"'' 42 the use of this method would not prove a
hardship or burden on many lenders or retailers. Standardization of
the calculation of interest would help prevent violation of usury laws
because the loan yield determines whether a transaction is usurious.
Since all direct and indirect costs are included in the loan yield, the
attempts of lenders and retailers to charge additional fees would be
curtailed. 43 Furthermore, this proposal eliminates confusing meth-
ods of computing interest that complicate the determination of the
cost of credit.'"
B. Standardization of Interest Rate Ceilings
The overlap of usury laws is a problem readily solved. First,
credit transactions should be classified according to their purpose.
Three types of credit transactions that usury statutes should protect
are consumer credit transactions, 145 financing of residential real es-
against the person obtaining the loan or against the seller, lender, mortgagee or any
other party to the transaction except any actual settlement costs.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
140. Id. § 301(d).
141. "Actual settlement costs" means reasonable sums paid for:
(a) Any insurance premiums which have been approved by the Insurance Com-
missioner of the Commonwealth.
(b) Title examination and search, and examination of public records.
(c) The preparation and recording of any or all documents required by law or
custom for settlement.
(d) Appraisal and/or survey of property securing the loan.
(e) A single service charge, which shall include any consideration paid by the
residential mortgage debtor and received and retained by the residential mortage
lender for or related to the acquisition, making, refinancing or modification of a resi-
dential mortgage loan, plus any consideration received by the residential mortgage
lender for making a mortgage commitment, whether or not an actual loan follows
such commitment.
The service charge shall not exceed one per cent of the original bona fide princi-
pal amount of the loan, except that in the case of a construction loan, the service
charge shall not exceed two per cent of the original bona fide principal amount of the
loan.
(f) Charges and fees necessary for or related to the transfer of the property or the
closing of the residential mortgage loan, paid by the residential mortgage debtor and
received by any party other than the residential mortgage lender, whether or not paid
by the residential mortgage debtor directly to the third party or to the residential
mortgage lender for payment to the third party.
Id § 101.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1976). For an excellent discussion of the types of consumer
transactions subject to the Truth in Lending Act, see Landers, The Scope of Coverage of the
Truth in Lending Act, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 565.
143. See notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
145. The NCA adopts the phrase "consumer credit transaction." The phrase combines
into one term the three classes of transactions used in the UCCC: consumer credit sales, con-
sumer loans, and consumer leases. N.C.A. § 1.301(10) Comment. The UCCC's preservation
tate, 146 and credit transactions for business and agricultural pur-
poses.' 47 Second, a revision must establish a standard rate for each
of these transactions. 148 The standard rate would apply regardless of
whether the transaction is a loan or an installment sale.'4 9 As a re-
sult, retailers and lenders would be unable to circumvent the rate
ceilings established by law. In setting rates, the legislature, however,
should allow lenders and retailers to make a reasonable profit. The
Arkansas experience with a restrictive interest rate illustrates the
harm caused by low rate ceilings.
150
Another method would allow rates to fluctuate according to ec-
onomic conditions. In the Residential Mortgage Act the legislature
of the time-price distinction between credit sales and loans has received criticism. First, the
distinction provides a basis for lack of uniformity in rate ceilings. Second, it results in restric-
tions on high-rate lenders but not on retailers who compete with these lenders. Third, it com-
plicates what was intended to be a simple model act. Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.- An Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 510 (1969).
146. Credit transactions concerning residential real estate are currently regulated by the
Residential Mortgage Act. If the usury laws were revised, there would be no need to expand
the coverage of this type of credit. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
147. The classification of business and agricultural credit transactions merely extends the
provisions of the UCCC and NCA. See NCA § 1.301(8); UCCC § 1.301(12), (14), (15) (1974
act). Although many people who borrow for these purposes are capable of protecting them-
selves from overextensions of credit, the naive or needy businessman or farmer does need
protection. Therefore, loans and credit sales to these individuals should be protected. See
notes 72-82 and accompanying text supra.
148. The UCCC sets high rate ceilings on credit transactions. For example, the UCCC
adopts the following finance charges for consumer loans.
The finance charge, calculated according to the actuarial method, may not ex-
ceed the equivalent of the greater of either of the following:
(a) the total of:
(i) 36 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount
financed wich is $300 or less;
(ii) 21 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount
financed which exceeds $300 but does not exceed $1,000; and
(iii) 15 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount
financed which exceeds $1,000; or
(b) 18 per cent per year on the unpaid balances of the amount financed.
UCCC § 2.201(2) (1974 act). The basic assumption of the UCCC is that the operation of the
marketplace should control the rate of interest. The fear that rates will climb to unreasonable
levels, however, discourages adoption of the UCCC approach. See McEwen, Economic Issues
in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 387, 404-05 (1967).
The NCA, for example, finds these ceilings unjustified. "No available data adequately
supports the need for the high rate ceilings proposed in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
although such ceilings do exist in some states." NCA § 2.201 comment 2. The NCA thus
allows each state to set rate ceilings that are consistent with current usury statutes.
149. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
150. Arkansas adopted a 10% interest ceiling that applies to all types of credit.
All available evidence indicates that the Arkansas ten percent usury rate is doing
more harm than good. People in Arkansas are being denied credit available else-
where. The usury rate discourages risk capital for investment from entering Arkan-
sas unless it is disguised in out-of-state contracts. The Arkansas usury provision
generates a society of illegal lenders who must resort to deceptive devices to perform
what most agree to be a valuable and necessary social function, that of making credit
available to high risk borrowers.
Project, An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law.- "With Friends Like That. 1968
U. ILL. L.F. 544, 588. See also Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Percent Simple: The Arkansas
Case, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 592.
set forth a formula to determine the maximum interest rate.' 5 1 In
contrast, Virginia adopted a fluctuating rate for small loans, but pro-
vided no formula. 52 Instead, the Virginia Commissioner of Bank-
ing has the authority to vary rate ceilings in line with changes in
economic and business conditions. 5 3 This method of setting interest
rate ceilings is preferable to statutory maximum rates because a
lender "can present his case in full to an administrative agency
whose job it is to allow a fair rate of return so as to attract efficiently
managed capital into a small loan company investment."' 54
C Prevention of Forum Shopping
The citizens of Pennsylvania need protection from lenders and
sellers who attempt to use the laws of another state to exact a higher
rate of interest or finance charge.1 55 While the Goods and Services
Installment Sales Act (GSISA) 15 6 and Residential Mortgage Act 157
protect resident consumers and borrowers, other statutes lack these
provisions.
The UCCC has responded to "[t]he danger that creditors may
be able to induce consumers to agree that the applicable law will be
that of a creditors' haven that has no effective consumer credit pro-
tection. . .[by] invalidating choice of law agreements." 58 Since the
adoption of a provision to prevent forum shopping is necessary to an
effective usury system, a revision adopting either the GSISA or the
151. See notes 137-41 and accompanying text supra.
152. Small Loan Act, VA. CODE § 6.1-271 (1979).
153. The Small Loan Act provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he Commission shall determine and fix by regulation or order the maximum rates
of charge and amount of loan ceilings in connection with such loans which will in-
duce efficiently managed commercial capital to be invested in such business in suffi-
cient amounts to make available adequate credit facilities to individuals seeking such
loans, and which will afford those engaged in such business a fair and reasonable
return upon the assets. The Commission may from time to time, upon the basis of
changed conditions or facts, redetermine and refix any such maximum rates of charge
and amount of loan ceilings ....
Id
154. B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, supra note 6, at 119 (Supp. 1978).
155. For a discussion of the applicability of usury statutes to out-of-state national banks
see Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 99 S. Ct. 540 (1978).
See also note 130 supra.
156. See notes 127-28 and accompanying text supra.
157. See note 32 supra.
158. UCCC § 1.201 comment 4 (1974 act). Under the UCCC, an agreement by a con-
sumer who is a resident of the state is invalid if the Agreement provides:
(a) that the law of another jurisdiction apply;
(b) that the consumer consents to be subject to the process of another jurisdic-
tion;
(c) that the consumer appoints an agent to receive service of process;
(d) that fixes venue; and
(e) that the consumer consents to the jurisdiction of the court that does not other-
wise have jurisdiction.
Id See also NCA § 1.201.
UCCC provision would meet the void in current Pennsylvania usury
legislation.
V. Conclusion
Although the purpose of usury laws is the protection of necessi-
tous and inexperienced borrowers and consumers, the Pennsylvania
usury system does not always serve this function. Lenders employ
various methods in attempting to circumvent the intent of usury leg-
islation. The complexity of credit transactions creates consumer in-
difference to credit practices. Therefore, a revision of usury statutes
is needed to correct many of the existing defects.
Although statutory changes can solve many of the substantive
problems, informing consumers about credit and credit practices
may require a long-term educational process. Standardization of
terminology and credit practices is a fundamental part of any com-
prehensive revision of the usury system. While these changes may
not benefit the current generation of consumers, future generations
would benefit from these changes.' 59 The Pennsylvania legislature
must take steps to revise the usury code to prevent future Shylocks
from taking their "pound of flesh."
DAVID L. SCHWALM
159. See Sherrard, supra note 71, at 70.

